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Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact
that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of
some preference profile. However, this fact requires a number of voters that
is almost linear in the number of alternatives. It is therefore unclear whether
these results remain intact when the number of voters is bounded, as is, for
example, typically the case in search engine aggregation settings. In this pa-
per, we provide a systematic study of majority digraphs for a constant num-
ber of voters resulting in analytical, experimental, and complexity-theoretic
insights. First, we characterize the set of digraphs that can be induced by
two and three voters, respectively, and give sufficient conditions for larger
numbers of voters. Second, we present a surprisingly efficient implementa-
tion via SAT solving for computing the minimal number of voters that is
required to induce a given digraph and experimentally evaluate how many
voters are required to induce the majority digraphs of real-world and gen-
erated preference profiles. Finally, we leverage our sufficient conditions to
show that the winner determination problem of various well-known voting
rules remains hard even when there is only a small constant number of voters.
In particular, we show that Kemeny’s rule is hard to evaluate for 7 voters,
while previous methods could only establish such a result for constant even
numbers of voters.
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1 Introduction
A significant part of computational social choice, a relatively new interdisciplinary area
at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science, is concerned with the
computational complexity of voting problems. For most of the voting rules proposed
in the social choice literature, it has been studied how hard it is to determine winners,
to identify beneficial strategic manipulations, or to influence the outcome by bribing,
partitioning, adding, or deleting voters (see, e.g., Brandt et al., 2016b; Rothe, 2015;
Faliszewski et al., 2009). In many cases, the corresponding problems turned out to be
NP-hard. Depending on the nature of the problem, this can be interpreted as bad news—
as in the case of winner determination—or good news—as in the case of manipulation,
bribery, and control.
Many voting rules are based on the pairwise majority relation, which establishes a
fruitful connection between voting theory and graph theory. Perhaps the most funda-
mental result in this context is McGarvey’s theorem, which states that every asymmetric
directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference pro-
file (McGarvey, 1953). Unsurprisingly, McGarvey’s theorem is the basis of most hardness
results concerning majoritarian voting rules. McGarvey’s original construction requires
n(n − 1) voters, where n is the number of alternatives. This number has subsequently
been improved by Stearns (1959) and Erdo˝s and Moser (1964), who have eventually
shown that the number of required voters is of order Θ(n/ log n). Since the result by
Erdo˝s and Moser (1964) gives a lower bound as well, it implies that, for any constant
number of voters, there are majority digraphs that cannot be induced by any preference
profile.1 As a consequence, the mentioned hardness results only hold if the number of
voters is roughly of the same order as the number of alternatives.
In some applications, however, the number of voters is much smaller than the number
of alternatives and it is unclear whether hardness still holds. A typical example is
search engine aggregation, where the voters correspond to Internet search engines and
the alternatives correspond to the webpages ranked by the search engines (see, e.g.,
Dwork et al., 2001). Hudry (2008) writes that “to my knowledge, when not trivial, the
complexity for lower values of m [the number of voters] remains unknown. In particular,
it would be interesting to know whether some of the problems [. . . ] remain NP-hard
if m is a given constant”. For the particularly interesting case of Kemeny’s 1959 rank
aggregation rule, there is a notable exception: a proof by Dwork et al. (2001) shows
NP-hardness of this rule without needing to appeal to McGarvey’s result, and shows
that this hardness holds even if there are only 4 voters. The result also holds for every
larger even constant number of voters. In the Handbook of Computational Social Choice,
Fischer et al. (2016) note that “quite intriguingly, the case for any odd n ≥ 3 remains
open”. In a similar vein, Hudry (2008) writes that “it would be interesting to decide
whether it is still the case for fixed values of m with m odd”, and Biedl et al. (2009) find
that Dwork et al.’s method “does not work for odd numbers of [voters]” and write that
particularly the case for n = 3 remains “wide open”.
1The same holds for tournaments (Moon, 1968, Ex.1 (d)).
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In this paper, we provide a systematic study of majority digraphs for a constant
number of voters resulting in analytical, experimental, and complexity-theoretic insights.
Starting from a discussion of bounds on the size of the smallest tournaments that require
a certain number of voters (Section 3), we analyze the structure of majority digraphs
inducible by a constant number of voters. Obviously, the less voters there are, the
more restricted is the corresponding class of inducible majority digraphs. For instance,
digraphs induced by two voters have to be acyclic (and are subject to some additional
restrictions).
Analytically, we characterize digraphs inducible by two and three voters, respectively,
and provide sufficient conditions for digraphs to be induced by k voters (Section 4).
We propose a surprisingly efficient implementation via SAT solving for computing the
minimal number of voters that is required to induce a given digraph (Section 5) and
experimentally evaluate how many voters are required to induce the majority digraphs
of real-world and generated preference profiles (Section 6).
In Section 7, we then finally leverage the conditions from Section 4 to investigate
whether common, computationally intractable voting rules (the Banks set, the tourna-
ment equilibrium set, Kemeny’s rule, Slater’s rule, and ranked pairs) remain intractable
when there is only a small constant number of voters. This is achieved by analyzing ex-
isting hardness proofs and checking whether the class of majority digraphs used in these
constructions can be induced by small constant numbers of voters. Perhaps surprisingly,
it turns out that all hardness proofs we studied can be constructed using at most 11
voters, and for many proofs, including one for Kemeny’s rule, 7 voters suffice.
The paper concludes with an overview of the achieved hardness results, summarized
in Table 6, and a brief outlook on future research in Section 8.
Our work can be viewed as complementary to the work by Conitzer et al. (2007) who
considered manipulation problems with a constant number of candidates. Conitzer et al.
determined how many candidates are required such that the problem of coalitional ma-
nipulation with weighted voters becomes NP-hard for a number of tractable voting rules
including Borda’s rule, Copeland’s rule, and maximin.
2 Preliminaries
This section introduces the notation and terminology required to state our results.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (V,E), where V is finite a set of vertices and
E ⊆ V ×V is a set of arcs (directed edges). The size of a digraph is its number of vertices
|V |. By G we denote the class of all digraphs and by Gn the class all digraphs of size n.
The converse of E is E = {(w, v) : (v,w) ∈ E}, where the direction of all arcs is reversed.
Often it will be useful to effectively disregard orientations by considering
←→
E = E ∪ E.
We say that E1 and E2 are orientation compatible if E1 ∩ (
←→
E1 ∩
←→
E2) = E2 ∩ (
←→
E1 ∩
←→
E2),
i.e., if for all e ∈
←→
E1 ∩
←→
E2, e ∈ E1 if and only if e ∈ E2.
The incomparability graph G˜ = (V, E˜) associated with a digraph (V,E) is defined such
that for all v,w ∈ V ,
(v,w) ∈ E˜ if and only if neither (v,w) ∈ E nor (w, v) ∈ E.
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Obviously,
←→
E˜ = E˜.
A digraph G = (V,E) is said to be transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ V , (x, y) ∈ E
and (y, z) ∈ E imply (x, z) ∈ E. Moreover, G is acyclic if for all x1, . . . , xk ∈ V ,
(x1, x2), (x2, x3), ..., (xk−1, xk) ∈ E implies (xk, x1) 6∈ E. Also G is asymmetric if
(v,w) ∈ E implies (w, v) /∈ E. A tournament is an asymmetric digraph (V,E) where E
is complete, i.e., if for all distinct v,w ∈ V , either (v,w) ∈ E or (w, v) ∈ E. We denote
the sets of all tournaments by T and the set of those with n vertices by Tn. Moreover,
a digraph (V,E) is transitively (re)orientable if there exists a transitive and asymmetric
digraph (V,E′) with
←→
E′ =
←→
E . E′ is also referred to as a reorientation of E.
The digraphs in this paper are assumed to be induced by the preferences of a set of
voters. Let N = {1, . . . , k} be a set of k voters (or an electorate of size k) and V a set
of alternatives. The preferences of each voter i are given as linear orders, i.e., transitive,
complete, and antisymmetric relations Ri over a set of alternatives V . A preference
profile R = (R1, . . . , Rk) associates a preference relation with each voter. Each preference
profile gives rise to a majority relation, which holds between two alternatives v and w if
the number of voters preferring v to w exceeds the number of voters preferring w to v.
We say that (V,E) is the majority digraph of preference profile R if
(v,w) ∈ E if and only if |{i ∈ N : v Ri w}| > |{i ∈ N : w Ri v}|.
Majority digraphs are asymmetric. Moreover, if the number of voters is odd, the majority
digraph is complete and thus a tournament.
We say that (V,E) is k-inducible if (V,E) is the majority digraph for some preference
profile involving k voters. Equivalently, we say that (V,E) is a k-majority digraph.2 As
an example, Figure 1 shows a tournament which is induced by a 3-voter profile, and thus
this tournament is a 3-inducible majority digraph.
a
b
c
de
1 1 1
a d c
b e e
c a b
d b d
e c a
Figure 1: A majority digraph and a 3-voter preference profile that induces the digraph.
We also consider weighted digraphs (V,w), where V is a set of vertices and w: V ×V →
Z a weight function assigning weight w(v,w) to the arc (v,w). With a slight abuse of
notation we also refer to weighted digraphs as a pair (V,E), where the weight function is
subsumed and it is understood that E = {(v,w) : w(v,w) > 0}. We say that a weighted
2Alon et al. (2006) used the term k-majority tournament for tournaments that are induced by a (2k−1)-
voter profile because every majority consists of at least k voters. We chose to follow the terminology
of Kierstead et al. (2009) instead.
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digraph (V,w) is induced by R if for all v,w ∈ V , w(v,w) = |{i ∈ N : v Ri w}| − |{i ∈
N : w Ri v}|. In this case, (V,w) is a weighted k-majority digraph.
Given a (weighted) digraph we are interested in the minimal number of voters needed
such that the digraph represents the (weighted) majority relation of the voters’ pref-
erences. This is captured in the majority dimension of the digraph.3 Formally, the
majority dimension of a digraph G = (V,E) or a weighted digraph G = (V,w) is the
smallest number of voters in a profile that induces G, i.e.,
dim(G) = min{k : G is a (weighted) k-majority digraph}.
Also, let kmaj(n) denote the minimum electorate size required to induce all digraphs of
size n, i.e.,
kmaj(n) = min{k : dim(G) ≤ k for all G ∈ Gn}.
If we restrict our attention to tournaments, we will write kTmaj(n) instead. Note that
kTmaj(n) ≤ kmaj(n) since T ⊂ G.
Conversely, define the majoritarian expressiveness of (electorates of size) k to be the
maximum integer nT (k) such that every complete majority relation on up to nT (k)
alternatives is k-inducible. Since the work by Erdo˝s and Moser (1964), which we discuss
in more detail in Section 3, it is known that nT (k) is finite for every k. Note that
this implies, that the smallest tournament that cannot be induced by k voters is of
size nT (k) + 1.
By a voting rule we understand a function that maps each preference profile to a non-
empty subset of the alternatives. Over the years, a large number of voting rules have
been proposed. The ones we will be concerned with in this paper—because they are
based on majority digraphs and computationally intractable—are the Banks set (BA),
the tournament equilibrium set (TEQ), Slater’s rule (SL), and ranked pairs (RP). The
definitions of these rules are given in Section 7.
3 Bounds on the Majority Dimension and Majoritarian
Expressiveness
This section is concerned with bounds on the majority dimension of digraphs and on the
majoritarian expressiveness of electorates of a fixed size.
The first such result is due to McGarvey (1953), who showed that every digraph can
be induced by some (finite) preference profile. He gave a construction that requires
exactly two voters per arc in the digraph. In our notation, this implies that kmaj(n) ≤
n(n− 1) <∞ for all n.
The work by McGarvey has been followed up by Stearns (1959) who showed that
kmaj(n) ≤ n+2 which was later improved by Fiol (1992) to kmaj(n) ≤ n−⌊logn⌋+1. For
larger n, Erdo˝s and Moser (1964) gave the asymptotically better bound kmaj(n) ≤ c·
n
logn
3This complexity measure of digraphs can also be interpreted as a complexity measure of preference
profiles. The majority dimension of a given preference profile is then simply defined as the majority
dimension of the induced majority digraph.
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for some constant c. Their work nicely complemented a second result by Stearns (1959)
who proved that kmaj(n) > 0.55 ·
n
logn for large n. These results together asymptotically
capture the growth of kmaj(n).
Theorem 1 (Stearns, 1959, Erdo˝s and Moser, 1964). kmaj(n) ∈ Θ(
n
logn).
In the following, we are particularly interested in the majority dimension of tourna-
ments. The following simple observation about the parity of dim(G) will be useful.
Lemma 1. The majority dimension dim(G) is odd if G is a tournament and even
otherwise.
Proof. Let G be a tournament and assume that dim(G) = k was even. Then there exists
a preference profile R with k voters that induces T . Since k is even, the majority margin
must be even for every pair of alternatives and can furthermore never be zero as T is
a tournament. Therefore, removing any single voter from R gives a profile R′ with just
k − 1 voters that still induces T , a contradiction.
For incomplete digraphs, the statement follows directly from the fact that for all
preference profiles R with an odd number of voters k, the majority relation is complete
and anti-symmetric (as no majority ties can occur).
Note that the lower bound on kmaj(n) due to Stearns (1959) shows that for every
electorate of size k, there exist digraphs that are not k-inducible. Still, the majority
dimension of tournaments, kTmaj(n), could be bounded by a constant. In that case, all
tournaments could be inducible by some constant electorate size. The following lemma
shows that this is not the case. The argument is similar to the one by Stearns.
Lemma 2. If kTmaj(n) = k ≥ 3, then
(
n
2
)
· ln(2) ≤ k ·
(
ln(2) +
n∑
i=2
ln(i)
)
− ln(k!). (1)
Proof. If every tournament on n vertices can be induced by k voters, then for every
T ∈ Tn, there needs to be at least one k-voter profile that induces T . There are n! possible
preference orders over n alternatives, and—when ignoring the identities of voters—the
number of k-voter profiles is
(n!+k−1
k
)
. Also, the number of labeled tournaments on n
vertices is 2(
n
2
) implying that
2(
n
2
) ≤
(
n! + k − 1
k
)
≤
(2(n!))k
k!
where the last inequality follows from Fiol’s bound stated above. The result follows
immediately.
Using the lemma, we can search for an upper bound on the majoritarian expressiveness
nT (k) for a given k by finding the minimal m such that (1) is violated. Table 1 shows
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k 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
nT (k) 18 41 66 93 122 152 183 216 249 282
Table 1: Upper bounds on the size nT (k) of the smallest tournament that is not k-
inducible for small odd k.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
Figure 2: A tournament on 8 vertices with majority dimension 5. This is a smallest
tournament that cannot be induced by three voters. Omitted arcs point down-
wards.
some upper bounds for small k. For example, there exists a tournament of size 42 that
is not 5-inducible.4
It is clear, however, that these bounds are not tight. For example, the results in
the table imply there has to exist a tournament of size 19 that is not 3-inducible. In
fact, Shepardson and Tovey (2009) proved that every tournament that contains a certain
digraph of size 8 as a subgraph is not 3-inducible. In Section 6.1, we will argue that
there are no smaller tournaments with this property. An example of such a tournament
is shown in Figure 2.
Using an argument by Alon (2006), one can construct, for any odd k, concrete tour-
naments that are not k-inducible. Unfortunately, these tournaments turn out to be very
large.
Example 1. Consider the quadratic residue tournaments Qp of size p.
5 If p is a prime
congruent to 3 (mod 4) and p > 603, 979, 776 then Qp is not 5-inducible.
The argument by Alon (2006) runs along the following lines. A dominating set of
a digraph G = (V,E) is a set U ⊆ V such that for all v ∈ V \ U , there exists a
u ∈ U with (u, v) ∈ E. Alon (2006) showed that the size of the smallest dominating
set of any k-majority digraph for odd k is bounded from above by a function F(k) with
4A slightly tighter analysis even gives the existence of such a tournament of size 41.
5Qp = (V,E) with V = (v1, . . . , vp) and (vi, vj) ∈ E if and only if (i− j)
p−1
2 ≡ 1 mod p.
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F(k) ∈ O(k log k) and F(k) ∈ Ω( klog k ) with rather large constants hidden in the Landau
notation (80 for the upper bound). This means that if a given tournament T does not
have a dominating set of size F(k), then T is not k-inducible.
This can be leveraged to construct a tournament that is not k-inducible due to the
following constructive result by Graham and Spencer (1971). Let f(x) = p > x222x−2
where x is a positive integer and p is the smallest prime congruent to 3 (mod 4) satisfying
the inequality (the construction works for any such p). Then, the quadratic residue
tournament Qp of size p does not exhibit a dominating set of size x.
Together, this yields, for any odd k, a construction for a tournament on (f ◦ F)(k)
vertices that is not k-inducible. Unfortunately, f(x) is exponential in x, and the value
of F(k) is known precisely only for k = 3 where we have F(3) = 3. To the best of our
knowledge, the best currently available bound for k = 5 is F(5) ≤ 12 (Fidler, 2011).
Together, we get that for the smallest (or any other) prime p congruent to 3 (mod 4)
satisfying the inequality
p > 122 · 22·12−2 = 603, 979, 776
Qp is not 5-inducible.
Bounds on F(k) for larger odd k give significantly worse values: for 7 voters, we only
know that F(7) ≤ 44 (Fidler, 2011).
4 Majority Digraphs of Few Voters
In this section, we analyze the structure of k-inducible digraphs for constant k. Build-
ing on earlier work by Dushnik and Miller (1941) which entails a characterization of
2-majority digraphs, we give a characterization for the case of three voters. In addition,
we present sufficient conditions for larger majority dimensions that will be leveraged in
Section 7.
4.1 Two and Three Voters
Given a preference profile R, the Pareto relation holds between two alternatives v and w
if all voters prefer v over w. Dushnik and Miller (1941) specified sufficient and necessary
conditions for relations to be induced as the Pareto relation of a 2-voter profile. As for
two voters the majority relation and the Pareto relation coincide, we can rephrase their
result for majority digraphs as follows.
Lemma 3 (Dushnik and Miller, 1941). A majority digraph (V,E) is 2-inducible if and
only if it is transitive and its incomparability graph (V, E˜) is transitively orientable.
Moreover, the weight of every arc is 2.
See Figure 3a for an example of a digraph that is not 2-inducible even though it is
transitive. If it was 2-inducible, there would have to exist a transitive reorientation E′
of E˜. We can assume without loss of generality that (b, d) ∈ E′. But then (a, d) and
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ab
c
e
d
f
(a) This digraph is not 2-inducible. Dotted
arcs denote the incomparability graph.
(b) Every forest of uni-
directed stars is 2-
inducible.
Figure 3: Examples of transitive digraphs.
(e, b) also have to be in E′ leaving no possibility to orient {a, e} without obtaining a
contradiction to the assumed transitivity of E′.
If, on the other hand, a digraph (V,E) is in fact induced by a 2-voter profile (R1, R2),
then R1 and R2 coincide on E and are opposed on E˜, i.e., R1 ∩R2 = E. As R1 and R2
are both transitive, so is E. If E′ is the respective reorientation of E˜, then R1 = E ∪E
′
and R2 = E ∪ E′, or vice versa.
A digraph (V,E) is an unidirected star if there is some v∗ ∈ V such that either E or
E equals {v∗}× (V \ {v∗}). Clearly, (V,E) is transitive as there are no v,w, u ∈ V such
that both (v,w), (w, u) ∈ E. Moreover, every transitive relation over the leaves of (V,E)
serves as a transitive orientation of E˜. With Lemma 3 this gives us the following result,
which is a special case of Lemma 1 by Erdo˝s and Moser (1964).
Lemma 4. Every unidirected star is 2-inducible.
Another insight that follows from Lemma 3, is that the union of pairwise disjoint
digraphs that are induced by 2-voter profiles is also induced by a 2-voter profile.
Lemma 5. Let V1, . . . , Vk be pairwise disjoint and (V1, E1), . . . , (Vk, Ek) 2-inducible ma-
jority digraphs. Then, (V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk, E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek) is also 2-inducible.
Proof. Let V = V1∪· · ·∪Vk and E = E1∪· · ·∪Ek and consider the digraph (V,E). Since
each of (V1, E1), . . . , (Vk, Ek) is 2-inducible, by Lemma 3, each of E1, . . . , Ek is transitive
and each of E˜1, . . . , E˜k is transitively orientable. Let E
′
1, . . . , E
′
k be the respective tran-
sitive reorientations of E˜1, . . . , E˜k. Since V1, . . . , Vk are pairwise disjoint, E1 ∪ · · · ∪ E2
can readily be seen to be transitive as well. Let furthermore E∗ =
⋃
1≤i<j≤k(Vi × Vj).
Observe that E˜ = E˜1∪· · ·∪E˜k∪E˜
∗ and that E′1∪· · ·∪E
′
k∪E
∗ is a transitive reorientation
of E˜. The claim then follows by another application of Lemma 3.
Consequently, every forest of (unidirected) stars such as the one shown in Figure 3b
is 2-inducible.6
6Erdo˝s and Moser (1964) gave a class of digraphs that are 2-inducible which they call bilevel graphs.
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Apart from a family of tournaments of order eight that are not k-inducible (Shepardson and Tovey,
2009), little was known about 3-majority digraphs. In a much similar vein as Lemma 3,
we now provide a characterization of these digraphs.
Lemma 6. A tournament (V,E) is 3-inducible if and only if there are disjoint sets
E1, E2 with E = E1∪E2 such that E1 is transitive and E2 is both acyclic and transitively
reorientable. Then, the weight of every arc in E1 is either 1 or 3 and that of each arc
in E2 is 1.
Proof. For the if-direction, assume that there are disjoint sets E1, E2 with E = E1 ∪E2
such that E1 is transitive and E2 is both acyclic and transitively reorientable. Con-
sider the digraph (V,E1) and observe that for the corresponding incomparability graph
(V, E˜1), E˜1 =
←→
E2. It follows that E˜1 is transitively orientable and, by Lemma 3, that
(V,E1) is induced by a 2-voter profile (R1, R2) and that all arcs in E1 have weight 2.
As E2 is acyclic, there is a (strict) preference relation R3 with E2 ⊆ R3. Now consider
the majority digraph induced by the preference profile (R1, R2, R3), which apparently
coincides with (V,E). E1 is determined by R1 and R2 and each of its arcs obtains
weight 1 or 3 depending on whether R3 agrees with both R1 and R2 or not. Moreover,
E2 is determined by R3, as R1 and R2 can be assumed to specify contrary preferences
on this part.
For the only-if-direction, assume that (V,E) is the majority digraph induced by the
3-voter profile (R1, R2, R3). Let furthermore (V,E1) be the majority digraph induced
by (R1, R2) and E2 = R3 ∩ ((V × V ) \
←→
E1). By Lemma 3, (V,E1) is transitive and
E˜1 is transitively (re)orientable, where (V, E˜1) is the incomparability graph of (V,E1).
Since R3 is transitive (and strict) E2 is obviously acyclic. Observe furthermore that
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R3 ∩ ((V × V ) \
←→
E1) =
←→
E˜1. It follows that E2 is transitively reorientable.
In order to illustrate Theorem 6, again consider the introductory example given in
Figure 1. This digraph is 3-inducible because its arc set can be partitioned into a
transitive part and an acyclic and transitively reorientable part (see Figure 4)
4.2 More than Three Voters
Extensions of these results provide useful sufficient conditions for a digraph to be induced
by a constant larger number of voters. If the arc set of a digraph can be decomposed
into pairwise orientation compatible sets that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3, the
digraph is induced by a profile with two voters per set.
Lemma 7. Let (V,E1), . . . , (V,Ek) be majority digraphs induced by 2-voter profiles such
that E1, . . . , Ek are pairwise orientation compatible. Then, (V,E1 ∪ · · · ∪Ek) is induced
by a 2k-voter profile.
A bilevel graph is the union of a finite number of vertex-disjoint digraphs (V1, E1), (V2, E2), · · · such
that each (Vi, Ei) is complete bipartite and unidirected, i.e., there is a partition into vertex sets
Vi,1, Vi,2 such that Ei = Vi,1 × Vi,2.
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E1 is transitive.
a
b
c
de
E2 is acyclic and
a
b
c
de
transitively reorientable.
a
b
c
de
Figure 4: A 3-inducible majority digraph and its arc set partitioning into E1 and E2.
Proof. Let for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (Ri1, R
i
2) be a 2-voter profile that induces (V,Ei).
By Lemma 3, for every (v,w) ∈ Ei we know that both v R
i
1 w and v R
i
2 w and
for every (v,w) /∈ Ei, v R
i
1 w if and only if w R
i
2 v. Now consider the preference
profile (R11, R
1
2, . . . , R
k
1 , R
k
2) and the majority digraph (V,E) it induces. We argue that
E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪Ek. First assume that (v,w) ∈ Ei for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, both
v Ri1 w and v R
i
2 w. Since E1, . . . , Ek are pairwise orientation compatible, (w, v) ∈ Ej
for no j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, i.e., for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k either v Rj1 w and v R
j
2 w,
or v Rj1 w if and only if w R
j
2 v. It follows that a majority prefers v over w and thus
(v,w) ∈ E. Now assume that (v,w) ∈ Ei for no i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then for all i with
1 ≤ i ≤ k either both w Ri1 v and w R
i
2 v or w R
j
1 v if and only if v R
j
2 w. It is easy to
see that v is not majority preferred to w, i.e., (v,w) /∈ E.
Next, we show that a similar condition suffices for a digraph to be inducible by a given
odd number of voters.7
Lemma 8. Let (V,E) be a tournament and (V,E1), . . . , (V,Ek) be majority digraphs in-
duced by 2-voter profiles such that E,E1, . . . , Ek are orientation compatible. Let, more-
over, Ek+1 ⊇ E \ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek) be acyclic. Then, (V,E) is induced by a 2k + 1-voter
profile.
Proof. In virtue of Lemma 7 we know that (V,E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek) is induced by a 2k-
voter profile (R11, R
1
2, . . . , R
k
1 , R
k
2). Inspection of the proof also reveals that every arc
(v,w) ∈ E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek has a positive even weight of at least two. As Ek+1 is acyclic
and asymmetric, there is some (strict) preference relation Rk+1 with Ek+1 ⊆ R
k+1.
Moreover, since Ek+1 corresponds to only one voter and every arc in E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek
7The if-direction of Lemma 6 can also be obtained as a special case of this lemma.
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Preference profiles Tournaments
k = 1 k = 3 k = 5 (unlabeled)
n = 5 120 ∼ 1.7 · 106 ∼ 2.5 · 1010 12
n = 10 ∼ 3.6 · 106 ∼ 4.8 · 1019 ∼ 6.3 · 1032 ∼ 9.7 · 106
n = 25 ∼ 1.6 · 1025 ∼ 3.7 · 1075 ∼ 9.0 · 10125 ∼ 1.3 · 1065
n = 50 ∼ 3.0 · 1064 ∼ 2.8 · 10193 ∼ 2.6 · 10322 ∼ 1.9 · 10305
n = 100 ∼ 9.3 · 10157 ∼ 8.1 · 10473 ∼ 7.1 · 10789 > 101332
Table 2: Number of objects involved in the Check-k-Majority problem for one, three,
and five voters.
has a majority of at least two, Ek+1 does not have to be orientation compatible with
any of E1, . . . , Ek. It can then easily be seen that the majority digraph induced by
(R11, R
1
2, . . . , R
k
1 , R
k
2 , R
k+1) equals (V,E), E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek being determined by majorities
of at least one in (R11, R
1
2, . . . , R
k
1 , R
k
2 , R
k+1) and E \ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek) by R
k+1, each arc
in which has then weight one.
5 Determining the Majority Dimension of a Digraph
This section addresses the computational problem of computing the majority dimension.
To this end, we define the problem of checking whether a given digraph G is k-inducible,
i.e., whether G is a k-majority digraph.
Check-k-Majority
Input: A digraph G and a positive integer k.
Question: Is G a k-majority digraph?
Recall that for a digraph G, whether dim(G) is odd or even depends on whether G is
complete (i.e., a tournament) or not, according to Lemma 1. While Check-2-Majority
can be solved in polynomial time (Yannakakis, 1982), the complexity of Check-k-
Majority remains open for every fixed k ≥ 3.
In the following, we provide an implementation for solving Check-k-Majority. This
implementation relies on an encoding of the problem as a Boolean satisfiability (SAT)
problem which is then solved by a SAT solver. This technique turns out to be surprisingly
efficient and easily outperforms an implementation for Check-3-Majority based on
the graph-theoretic characterization in Section 4.
5.1 Computing the Majority Dimension via SAT
The number of objects potentially involved in the Check-k-Majority problem are
given in Table 2. It is immediately clear that a naive algorithm will not solve the
problem in a satisfactory manner.
Thus, in order to answer Check-k-Majority, we translate the problem to proposi-
tional logic (on a computer) and use state-of-the-art SAT solvers to find a solution. At
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Algorithm 1: Sat-Check-k-Majority
Input: digraph (V,E), positive integer k
Output: whether (V,E) is a k-majority digraph
/* Encoding of problem in CNF */
File cnfFile;
foreach voter i do
cnfFile += Encoder.reflexivePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.completePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.transitivePreferences(i);
cnfFile += Encoder.antisymmetricPreferences(i);
end
cnfFile += Encoder.majorityImplications((V,E));
if E is not complete then
cnfFile += Encoder.indifferenceImplications((V,E));
end
/* SAT solving */
Boolean satOutcome = SATsolver.solve(cnfFile);
return satOutcome;
a glance, the overall solving steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
A satisfying instance of the propositional formula to be designed should represent a
preference profile that induces the given digraph. We encode the preference profile in
question using Boolean variables ri,a,b, which encode whether a Ri b, i.e., whether voter
i ranks alternative a at least as high as alternative b. We then need to impose the
following constraints.
1. All k voters have linear orders over the n alternatives as their preferences.
2. For each majority arc (x, y) ∈ E in the digraph, a majority of voters needs to
prefer x over y.
3. For each missing arc (x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x) in the digraph, exactly half the voters need
to prefer x over y.8
For the first constraint, we encode reflexivity, completeness, transitivity, and anti-
symmetry of the relation Ri for all voters i. The complete translation to CNF (con-
junctive normal form, the established standard input format for SAT solvers) is given
exemplarily for the case of transitivity; reflexivity, completeness, and anti-symmetry are
converted analogously:
8This axiom is only required for incomplete digraphs.
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(∀i)(∀x, y, z) (x Ri y ∧ y Ri z → x Ri z)
≡ (∀i)(∀x, y, z) (ri,x,y ∧ ri,y,z → ri,x,z)
≡
∧
i
∧
x,y,z
(¬ (ri,x,y ∧ ri,y,z) ∨ ri,x,z)
≡
∧
i
∧
x,y,z
(¬ri,x,y ∨ ¬ri,y,z ∨ ri,x,z) .
The key in the translation of the inherently higher order axioms to propositional logic
is (as pointed out by Geist and Endriss (2011) already) that due to finite domains, all
quantifiers can be replaced by finite conjunctions or disjunctions, respectively.
Majority and indifference implications can be formalized in a similar fashion. We
describe the translation for the majority implications here; the procedure for the in-
difference implications (needed for incomplete digraphs) is analogous. In the following,
we denote the smallest number of voters required for a positive majority margin by
m(k) := ⌊k · 12⌋+ 1. Note that, due to the anti-symmetry of individual preferences, for
(x, y) ∈ E it suffices that there exist m(k) voters who prefer x to y. In formal terms:
(∀x, y) ((x, y) ∈ E → |{i : x Ri y}| > |{i : y Ri x}|)
≡ (∀x, y) ((x, y) ∈ E → |{i : x Ri y}| ≥ m(k))
≡ (∀x, y) ((x, y) ∈ E → (∃M ⊆ K)|M | = m(k) ∧ (∀i ∈M)x Ri y)
≡
∧
(x,y)∈E
∨
|M |=m(k)
∧
i∈M
ri,x,y.
In order to avoid an exponential blow-up when converting this formula to CNF,
the standard technique of variable replacement (also known as Tseitin transformation
(Tseitin, 1983)) is applied. Note that the conditions like |M | = m(k) can easily be
checked during generation of the corresponding CNF formula on a computer.
Overall, this encoding leads to a total of k · n2 +
( k
m(k)
)
· n2 = n2 ·
(
k +
( k
m(k)
))
variables for the case of tournaments and n2·
(
k +
( k
m(k)
)
+
( k
k/2
))
variables for incomplete
digraphs. The number of clauses is equal to k · (n3 + n2) + n
2−n
2 ·
(
1 +
( k
m(k)
)
·m(k)
)
for tournaments, and at most k · (n3 + n2) + (n2 − n) ·
(
1 +
( k
k/2
)
· k2
)
for incomplete
digraphs, respectively.
With all axioms formalized in propositional logic, we are now ready to analyze arbi-
trary digraphs G for their majority dimension dim(G). Before we do so, however, we
describe an optimization technique for tournament graphs, which, for certain instances,
significantly speeds up the computation.
5.1.1 Optimization through Decomposition of Tournaments
An important structural property in the context of tournaments is whether a tourna-
ment admits a non-trivial decomposition (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a).
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Brandt et al. (2011) show how these decompositions can be exploited to recursively de-
termine the winners of certain voting rules. In this section, we prove that a similar
optimization can be carried out for the computation of the majority dimension dim(G)
of a given tournament G. In particular, we show that the majority dimension of a tour-
nament is equal to the maximum of the majority dimension of its components and the
corresponding summary.
In formal terms, a non-empty subset C of V is a component of a tournament G =
(V,E) if, for all v ∈ V \ C, either (v,w) ∈ E for all w ∈ C or (w, v) ∈ E for all
w ∈ C. A decomposition of G is a set of pairwise disjoint components {C1, . . . , Cp}
of T such that V =
⋃p
j=1Cj . Every tournament admits a decomposition that is min-
imal in a well-defined sense (Laslier, 1997) and that can be computed in linear time
(McConnell and de Montgolfier, 2005; Brandt et al., 2011). Given a particular decom-
position C˜ = {C1, . . . , Cp}, the summary of (V,E) with respect to C˜ is defined as the
tournament (C˜, E˜) on the individual components rather than the alternatives, i.e.,
(Cq, Cr) ∈ E˜ if and only if (v,w) ∈ E for all v ∈ Cq, w ∈ Cr.
The following lemma enables the recursive computation of dim(G) along the compo-
nent structure of G.
Lemma 9. Let G = (V,E) be a tournament, C˜ = {C1, . . . , Cp} a decomposition of G,
Gj = (Cj , E|Cj ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and G˜ = (C˜, E˜). Then
dim(G) = max
j
{dim(Gj ,dim(G˜))}.
Proof. Let R be a minimal profile inducing G. Then, R|Cj induces Gj for every Cj
establishing dim(G) ≥ dim(Gj). That dim(G) ≥ dim(G˜) holds is also easy to see by
considering a variant of R in which from each component all but one vertex are chosen
arbitrarily and removed. The remaining profile then induces G˜. For the other direction,
let z = maxj{dim(Gj),dim(G˜)}. We know by Lemma 1 that dim(G˜) and every dim(Gj)
is odd as these are all tournaments. Each Gj (and G˜) has a minimal profile R
j (and
R˜, respectively). We can add pairs of voters with opposing preferences to each profile
without changing its majority relation. This way, we get profiles R′j (and R˜′) that still
induce Gj (and G˜, respectively) but now all have the same number of voters z. Now,
create a new profile R from R′ in which Rji replaces alternative j as a segment in R
′
i for
each voter i and every alternative j. It is easy to check that R has z voters and still
induces G, i.e., dim(G) ≥ z.
We have implemented this optimization and found that many real-world majority di-
graphs exhibit non-trivial decompositions, speeding up the computation of Sat-Check-
k-Majority.
5.2 Computational Efficiency
The characterization of 3-majority digraphs in Section 4 allows for a straightforward
algorithm, which is expected to have a much better running time than any naive imple-
mentation enumerating all preference profiles (also compare Table 2). The corresponding
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Algorithm 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 50 100
Sat < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s 0.1s 1.5s 12.5s
2-Partition < 0.1s < 0.1s 0.1s 530s — — — — —
Table 3: Comparison of average runtimes of Sat-Check-3-Majority and 2-
Partition-Check-3-Majority for randomly sampled tournaments of size n
with a cutoff time of one hour.
algorithm 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority is given in Algorithm 2. Besides enumer-
ating all 2-partitions of the majority arcs, the only non-trivial part is to check whether
a relation has a transitive reorientation. This can be done efficiently using an algorithm
by Pnueli et al. (1971).
We compared the running times of 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority with the ones
of our implementation via Sat as described in Section 5.1 (see also Algorithm 1).9
It turns out that—even though it is much more universal—Sat-Check-3-Majority
offers significantly better running times (see Table 3). Moreover, Sat-Check-k-Majority
directly returns a resulting preference profile with k voters.
Further runtimes, which exhibit the practical power of our SAT approach (and its
limits), can be obtained from Table 4. All experiments were run on an Intel Core
i5, 2.66GHz (quad-core) machine with 12 GB RAM using the SAT solver plingeling
(Biere, 2013). Interestingly, an integer programming (IP) formulation of the problem by
Eggermont et al. (2013) appears to perform worse than our SAT-based formalization:
Eggermont et al. report that for n > 20 runtimes are prohibitively large.
Algorithm 2: 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority
Input: tournament (V,E)
Output: whether (V,E) is a 3-majority digraph
foreach 2-partition {E1, E2} of E do
if E1 is transitive and E2 is acyclic and E2 has a transitive reorientation
then
return true;
end
end
return false;
6 Analyzing Majority Dimensions
Using the algorithm described in the previous section, we are now in a position to
analyze the majority dimension of digraphs. In this section, we report on our findings
for different sources of digraphs.
9As a programming language, Java was used in both cases.
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n\k 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 .04 .04 .03 .04 .04 .04 .04 .05 .08 .10
4 .03 .04 .03 .04 .04 .04 .05 .07 .10 .18
5 .03 .04 .03 .04 .06 .05 .06 .09 .16 .35
6 .03 .04 .04 .04 .05 .06 .08 .12 .27 .63
7 .04 .04 .04 .05 .05 .07 .10 .17 .45 1.10
8 .04 .05 .05 .05 .07 .08 .13 .23 .69 1.80
9 .04 .05 .05 .64 .07 .10 .17 .33 1.06 2.83
10 .05 .05 .06 .67 .09 .12 .23 .46 1.56 4.25
11 .06 .06 .06 1.92 .10 .14 .30 .63 2.22 6.37
12 .06 .07 .07 3.35 .12 .19 .40 .85 3.18 8.48
13 .07 .07 .09 3.93 .15 .27 .52 1.16 4.44 12.30
14 .07 .09 .10 4.15 .18 .36 .64 1.51 5.99 16.84
15 .08 .10 .13 3.89 .21 .88 .79 2.22 7.67 —
16 .09 .11 .14 4.12 .25 4.55 .99 2.90 9.80 —
17 .10 .12 .19 4.41 .29 7.15 1.23 4.69 12.48 —
18 .11 .14 .23 4.76 .35 17.51 1.53 8.25 15.97 —
19 .12 .15 .35 4.97 .43 — 1.80 — 19.99 —
20 .13 .17 .54 5.04 .47 — 2.21 — — —
21 .14 .18 5.87 6.15 .63 — 2.71 — — —
22 .16 .20 11.07 5.43 .96 — 3.24 — — —
23 .17 .23 18.95 5.76 1.57 — 4.12 — — —
24 .20 .26 — 5.87 2.56 — 4.60 — — —
25 .22 .29 — 6.12 4.21 — 5.85 — — —
Table 4: Runtime in seconds of Sat-Check-k-Majority for different number of alter-
natives and different number of voters k when average runtimes did not exceed
20 seconds. For this table, averages were taken over 5 samples from the uniform
random tournament model.
6.1 Exhaustive Analysis
Using the tournament generator from the nauty toolkit (McKay and Piperno, 2013),
we generated all tournaments with up to 10 alternatives and found that all of them are
5-inducible. In fact, all tournaments of size up to seven are even 3-inducible, confirming
a conjecture by Shepardson and Tovey (2009). Shepardson and Tovey also showed that
there exist tournaments of size 8 that are not 3-inducible. We also confirmed that the
exact number of such tournaments is 96 (out of 6880) as found by Eggermont et al.
(2013). One of these tournaments is depicted in Figure 2.
Like Eggermont et al. (2013), we have not encountered a single tournament for which
we could show that it is not 5-inducible. Since quadratic residue tournaments of enor-
mous size are the only concrete tournament of which we know that they have higher
majority dimension (see Section 3), we examined small tournaments of this kind as well
and found that
dim(Q11) = 3 and dim(Q19) = 5.
Unfortunately, we were not able to check whether the majority dimension of Q23 is equal
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to 5 or larger as the SAT solver did not terminate within a total of six weeks.10
6.2 Empirical Analysis
In the preference library PrefLib (Mattei and Walsh, 2013), scholars have contributed
data sets from real world scenarios ranging from preferences over movies or sushi via
Formula 1 championship results to real election data. Accordingly, the number of voters
whose preferences originally induced these data sets vary heavily between 4 and 44, 000.
At the time of writing, PrefLib contained 354 tournaments induced from pairwise
majority comparisons as well as 185 incomplete majority digraphs.
Among the tournaments in PrefLib, 58 are 3-inducible. The two largest tournaments
in the data set have 240 and 242 vertices, respectively. The first one is a 5-majority
tournament and the Sat solver did not terminate on the second one within one day.
The remaining tournaments are transitive and thus 1-inducible. Therefore, all checkable
tournaments in PrefLib are 5-inducible.
For the non-complete majority digraphs in PrefLib, we found that the indifference
constraints which are imposed on all missing arcs change the picture. Not only does it
negatively affect the running time of Sat-Check-k-Majority in comparison to tourna-
ments which made us restrict our attention to instances with at most 40 alternatives, but
it also results in higher majority dimensions of up to 8 among the 85 feasible instances.
6.3 Stochastic Analysis
Additionally, we consider stochastic models to generate tournaments of a given size n.
Many different models for linear preferences (or orderings) have been considered in the
literature. We refer the interested reader to Critchlow et al. (1991), Marden (1995),
Mattei et al. (2012), and Brandt and Seedig (2014). In this work, we decided to examine
tournaments generated with five different stochastic models.
In the uniform random tournament model, the same probability is assigned to each
labeled tournament of size n, i.e.,
Pr(T ) = 2−(
n
2
) for each T with |T | = n.
In all of the remaining models, we sample preference profiles and work with the tourna-
ment induced by the majority relation. In accordance with McCabe-Dansted and Slinko
(2006); Brandt and Seedig (2014), we generated profiles with 51 voters.
The impartial culture model (IC) is the most widely-studied model for individual
preferences in social choice. It assumes that every possible preference ordering has the
same probability of 1n! . If we add anonymity by having indistinguishable voters, the set
of profiles is partitioned into equivalence classes. In the impartial anonymous culture
(IAC), each of these equivalence classes is chosen with equal probability.
10Another specific tournament that we considered is a tournament on 24 alternatives used by
Brandt and Seedig (2013) to disprove a conjecture in social choice theory (Brandt et al., 2013). We
found that this tournament is 5-inducible, which implies that the negative consequences of the coun-
terexample already hold for settings with only 5 voters (and at least 24 alternatives).
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In Mallows-φ model (Mallows, 1957), the distance to a reference ranking is measured
by means of the Kendall-tau distance which counts the number of pairwise disagreements.
Let R0 be the reference ranking. Then, the Kendall-tau distance of a preference ranking
R to R0 is
τ(R,R0) =
(
n
2
)
− (|R ∩R0| − n) .
According to the model, this induces the probability of a voter having R as his preferences
to be
Pr(R) =
φτ(R,R0)
C
where C is a normalization constant and φ ∈ (0, 1] is a dispersion parameter. Small
values for φ put most of the probability on rankings very close to R0 whereas for φ = 1
the model coincides with IC.11
A very different kind of model is the spatial model. Here, alternatives and voters are
placed uniformly at random in a multi-dimensional space and the voters’ preferences
are determined by the (Euclidian) distanced to the alternatives. The spatial model
plays an important role in political and social choice theory where the dimensions are
interpreted as different aspects or properties of the alternatives (see, e.g., Ordeshook,
1993; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999).
For up to 21 alternatives, we sampled preference profiles (each consisting of 51 voters12)
from the aforementioned stochastic models and examined the corresponding majority
digraphs for their majority dimension using Sat-Check-k-Majority. The average
complexities over 30 instances of each size are shown in Table 5. We see that the unbiased
models (IC, IAC, uniform) tend to induce digraphs with higher majority dimension.
Again, we encountered no tournament that was not a 5-majority tournament. We also
checked more than 8 million uniform random tournaments with 12 alternatives. These
results could be used to argue that the majority dimension itself may be employed as a
parameter to govern the generation of realistic preference profiles.
7 Hardness of Voting with Few Voters
In this section, we show that the winner determination problem of four well-studied
voting rules remains NP-hard even if the number of voters is a small constant. Our
general method is to analyze existing hardness constructions for these rules with respect
to their susceptibility to the sufficient conditions in Lemma 7 or Lemma 8. In all cases, we
slightly modify the hardness constructions to get better bounds on the number of voters.
Before we proceed, we introduce two new constrained classes of propositional formula
11An interpretation of distance-based models such as Mallows-φ model is that there exists a pre-existing
truth in the form of a reference ordering and the agents report noisy estimates of said truth as their
preferences. For these models, Laslier has introduced the term Rousseauist cultures (Laslier, 2010).
12In another study (Brandt and Seedig, 2014), this size turned out to be sufficiently large to discriminate
the different underlying stochastic models.
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n uniform IC IAC
Mallows-φ
(φ = 0.95)
spatial
(dim = 2)
3 1.40 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.00
5 3.00 1.67 2.13 1.33 1.13
7 3.00 2.67 2.67 2.47 1.33
9 3.13 3.00 3.00 2.67 1.60
11 3.93 3.07 3.00 2.87 2.33
13 4.80 3.07 3.20 2.93 2.53
15 5.00 3.27 3.40 3.00 2.67
17 5.00 3.40 3.80 2.93 2.80
19 5.00 4.27 4.20 3.00 2.80
21 5.00 4.47 4.33 3.00 2.87
Table 5: Average majority dimension in tournaments generated by stochastic (prefer-
ence) models. The given values are averaged over 30 samples each.
(Ordered3-CNF, to be used for the results in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, and ReducedFew-
CNF, to be used for the result in Section 7.3) and show for both that the problem of
deciding whether a given formula is satisfiable is NP-complete.
A formula of propositional logic in conjunctive normal form (CNF) is in 3-CNF if each
clause has at most three literals. We say that a formula ϕ from 3-CNF is in Ordered3-
CNF if its clauses all contain exactly three distinct literals and are ordered within ϕ
in such a way that for each propositional variable p, all clauses containing the literal p
precede all clauses containing ¬p. It is known that 3Sat, the problem of deciding whether
a given formula in 3-CNF is satisfiable, is NP-complete (Karp, 1972). For formulae in
Ordered3-CNF, we call the corresponding decision problem Ordered3Sat.
Lemma 10. Ordered3Sat is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. For hardness, we reduce from 3Sat. Let ϕ be
some formula in 3-CNF. Let P denote the set of variables of the propositional language
in which ϕ is formulated and let C = (c1, . . . , c|C|) denote the clause set of ϕ. We may
assume without loss of generality that no clause contains the same variable twice, that
all literals in a clause are ordered according to a fixed ordering (p1, p2, . . .), and that
every clause is of size three. The latter is due to the fact that clauses of size one can
be easily used to simplify ϕ and the remaining clauses (p∨ q) of size two can be padded
with a new variable x to (p ∨ q ∨ x) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ ¬x). We call all variables that occur at
least once in ϕ original variables.
For the reduction, we construct an ordered formula ϕ′ in 3-CNF with 6 · |C| clauses
and 4 · |C| additional variables that is satisfiable if and only if ϕ is. For every clause
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ci = (ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3), define a set of new clauses ϕi =
∧6
j=1 c
j
i with
c1i = (ℓ1 ∨ xi ∨ x
′
i), c
2
i = (ℓ2 ∨ ¬xi ∨ yi),
c3i = (ℓ2 ∨ ¬x
′
i ∨ yi), c
4
i = (ℓ3 ∨ ¬yi ∨ zi),
c5i = (¬xi ∨ ¬yi ∨ ¬zi), and c
6
i = (¬x
′
i ∨ ¬yi ∨ ¬zi)
where xi, x
′
i, yi, and zi are new propositional variables. It is easy to check that ci is
satisfiable if and only if ϕi is. Since the literals associated with original variables are
spread over different ϕi just as they were over the different clauses ci in ϕ, this implies
that
∧
i ϕi is satisfiable if and only if ϕ is.
What remains to be shown is that all the clauses cji can be arranged in such a way
that the resulting formula is ordered. To this end, we define for each original variable p
and j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} the clause sets
Cp,j =
⋃
i
{cji : p ∈ c
j
i} and C
¬p,j =
⋃
i
{cji : p ∈ c
j
i}
as well as
C5 =
⋃
i
c5i and C
6 =
⋃
i
c6i .
We are now in a position to define ϕ′ to be
ϕ′ =
|P |∧
i=1
(( 4∧
j=1
∧
c∈Cpi,j
c
)
∧
( 4∧
j=1
∧
c∈C¬pi,j
c
))
∧
∧
c∈C5∪C6
c.
We claim that ϕ′ is ordered. We show this for original and new variables separately.
For each original variable p, all positive occurrences are in the Cp,j, preceding the neg-
ative occurrences in the C¬p,j.
For all new variables, the clauses in C5 ∪ C6 only contain negative occurrences and
are at the back of ϕ. Therefore, we only have to check that orderedness holds in the
first part of ϕ′. For each zi, this is trivially the case as it only occurs once (as a positive
literal) outside of C5 ∪C6. For the others that we denoted by xi, x
′
i, and yi, the positive
occurrences in Cpℓ,j ∪ C¬pℓ,j for some ℓ and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} always precede the single
negative occurrence in CpL,J ∪C¬pL,J for some J ∈ {2, 3, 4} and L 6= ℓ: due to the fixed
ordering of the literals within a clause we have that L > ℓ.
We say that a formula from 3-CNF is in Few-CNF if each literal appears at most
twice, and each variable appears at most thrice. We call the problem of checking whether
a formula given in Few-CNF is satisfiable FewSat. Tovey has shown that FewSat is
NP-complete (Tovey, 1984, Thm. 2.1). We follow his proof to show that this still holds
for formulae in ReducedFew-CNF where we additionally require that every variable
occurs in at most one three-literal clause and every literal in at most one two-literal
clause. Denote the corresponding decision problem by ReducedFewSat.
Lemma 11. ReducedFewSat is NP-complete.
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Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. For hardness, we reduce from 3Sat. Let ϕ :=∧n
i=1(xi ∨ yi ∨ zi) be some formula in 3-CNF where no clause contains the same variable
twice. For every variable v occurring in ϕ, replace each of its L occurrences with a new
variable vj where 1 ≤ j ≤ L. Now for every v occurring in ϕ, add the clauses
ϕv = (¬vL ∨ v1) ∧
L−1∧
j=1
(¬vj ∨ vj+1)
which are equivalent to (vL ⇒ v1) ∧
∧L−1
j=1 (vj ⇒ vj+1). Call the formula resulting from
these transformations red(ϕ). Note that red(ϕ) only contains clauses with three literals
(original clauses with replaced variables) or two literals (the new clauses); denote these
clause sets by C3 and C2, respectively. Also observe that every variable occurs exactly
once in C3 and every literal exactly once in C
2, i.e., red(ϕ) is in ReducedFew-CNF.
For every old variable v, we can only satisfy ϕv by setting all vj to the same value.
Since setting all vj to the same value t satisfies ϕv and has the same effect on the original
part of red(ϕ) that setting v to t has on ϕ, it follows that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if
red(ϕ) is satisfiable.
7.1 The Banks Set
The Banks set associates with each majority tournament the maximal elements of its
maximal (with respect to set-inclusion) transitive subtournaments (see, e.g., Laslier,
1997; Brandt et al., 2016a).
Although some alternative in the Banks set can be found in polynomial time using
a greedy algorithm (Hudry, 2004), deciding whether a specific alternative belongs to
the Banks set is NP-complete as shown by Woeginger (2003) by a reduction from 3-
colorability. Brandt et al. (2010) gave an arguably simpler proof of this result by a
reduction from 3Sat: every formula ϕ in 3-CNF can be transformed in polynomial time
into a tournament TBAϕ with a decision vertex c0 such that c0 is in the Banks set of T
BA
ϕ
if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Due to Lemma 10, this reduction works just as well if ϕ is
assumed to be ordered. Again, we have P denote the set of variables of the propositional
language in which ϕ is formulated.
A tournament (V,E) is in the class GBA if it satisfies the following properties. There
is an odd integer m such that,
V = C ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Um,
where C,U1, . . . , Um are pairwise disjoint and C = {c0, . . . , cm}. We have Ci denote the
singleton {ci} and U =
⋃m
i=1 Ui. If i is odd, Ui = {u
1
i , u
2
i , u
3
i } whereas if i is even Ui is a
singleton {ui}. Let X =
⋃
{Ui : i is odd} and Y =
⋃
{Ui : i is even}. Intuitively, (V,E)
is TBAϕ for some ϕ in ordered 3-CNF with
1
2(m+1) clauses. If i is odd, Ui corresponds to
a clause of ϕ and the vertices it contains represent (tokens of) literals. We assume each
of these vertices uji to be labeled by the literal λ(u
j
i ) it represents. For odd i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
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and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we define,
U ji = {u
j
i},
Upi = {u ∈ Ui : λ(u) = p}, and
U¬pi = {u ∈ Ui : λ(u) = ¬p}.
Moreover, for even i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we let
U ji = U
p
i = U
¬p
i = ∅.
Observe that
⋃
p∈P
1≤i≤m
(Upi ∪ U
¬p
i ) = X.
We are now in a position to define the arc set E, almost as in Brandt et al. (2010).13
Let
E =
⋃
i<j
(Cj × Ci) ∪
⋃
i<j
(
(Ui × Uj) \ Eϕ
)
∪
⋃
1≤i≤m
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
1
i × U
3
i )
)
∪
⋃
i 6=j
(Ci × Uj) ∪
⋃
i
(Ui × Ci) ∪ E
ϕ,
where
Eϕ =
⋃
p∈P
i<j
(Upj × U
¬p
i ) ∪
⋃
p∈P
i<j
(U¬pj × U
p
i ).
Figure 5 illustrates this type of tournament. The set Eϕ is the part of the tournament
TBAϕ that depends on the input formula. The arc set
(E \Eϕ) ∪ Eϕ
we refer to as its skeleton.
We will show that the skeleton of each tournament TBAϕ is induced by a 3-voter profile
such that the arcs in Eϕ all get a weight of one. At the same time, Eϕ is 2-inducible
such that the weight on all arcs is two. A little reasoning and an application of Lemma 8
then gives us the desired result.
Theorem 2. Computing the Banks set is NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 5.
Proof. Let (V,E) be a tournament in GBA. It suffices to show that (V,E) is induced by
a 5-voter profile. To this end define
E1 =
⋃
i
(Ui × Ci),
E2 = E
ϕ, and
E3 = E \ (E1 ∪ E2).
13There is only a slight change compared to the original construction by Brandt et al. (2010). Specifi-
cally, we now have arcs U1i ×U
3
i instead of the other way around. It is not difficult to check that the
argument of the reduction is not affected—it is irrelevant whether the crucial transitive subtourna-
ment with c0 as its maximal element may contain one, two, or three vertices from each Ui.
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Figure 5: A tournament TBAϕ = (V,E) in the class G
BA. Omitted arcs point downwards.
Moreover, λ(u35) = λ(u
3
3) = λ(u
3
1). The dotted and dashed upward arcs corre-
spond to the arc sets E1 and E2 in Theorem 2, respectively. The remaining
arcs, i.e., all downward arcs and the arcs within the Ui form an acyclic arc set
and correspond to E3.
Observe that E = E1 ∪E2 ∪E3 and that E1, E2, and E3 are pairwise disjoint. In virtue
of Lemma 8, it therefore suffices to show that (V,E1) and (V,E2) are induced by 2-voter
profiles and that (V,E3) is acyclic.
For (V,E1) it is easy to see that it is a union of unidirected stars and therefore 2-
inducible. For (V,E2), let
Ep2 =
⋃
i<j
(
Upj × U
¬p
i
)
∪
(
U¬pj × U
p
i
)
be the arcs in E2 associated with a variable p. Note that E2 =
⋃
p∈P E
p
2 and that
all Ep2 are vertex-disjoint from each other. Recall that (V,E) was in induced through a
construction that was based on an ordered formula. This implies that whenever Upj 6= ∅ 6=
U¬Pi we have that i is greater than j. Therefore, E
p
2 can also be written as
⋃
i,j(U
¬p
i ×U
p
j ).
In this representation, it is clear that Ep2 is a complete, unidirected bipartite digraph.
But then, E2 as a vertex-disjoint union of such digraphs is a bilevel graph and 2-inducible
according to Lemma 2 by Erdo˝s and Moser (1964), cf. Footnote 6 on page 9.
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To see that E3 is acyclic, note that it forms a subset of
C × U ∪
⋃
i<j
(Ui × Uj) ∪
⋃
i>j
(Ci × Cj) ∪
⋃
1≤i≤m
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
1
i × U
3
i )
)
and corresponds to all (shown) horizontal and (missing) downward arcs in Figure 5.
7.2 The Tournament Equilibrium Set
The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) is another voting rule that, like the Banks set, se-
lects a subset of alternatives from each tournament (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al.,
2016a). Its recursive definition is based on the notion of retentiveness. Given a tourna-
ment (V,E), a subset X ⊆ V is said to be TEQ-retentive if for all v ∈ X all alternatives
chosen by TEQ from the subtournament of (V,E) induced by {w ∈ V : (w, v) ∈ E} are
contained in X. TEQ is then defined so as to select the union of the inclusion-minimal
TEQ-retentive sets from each tournament.
Brandt et al. (2010) have shown that computing TEQ is NP-hard by a reduction
from 3Sat. By Lemma 10, the very same construction is also a valid reduction from
Ordered3Sat. For every formula ϕ in ordered 3-CNF a tournament TTEQϕ can be
constructed such that TEQ selects a decision vertex c0 from T
TEQ
ϕ if and only if ϕ is
satisfiable. The class of these tournaments TTEQϕ is denoted by GTEQ and the tourna-
ments in this class bear a strong structural similarity to those in GBA, which can be
exploited to show that every tournament in GTEQ is induced by a 7-voter profile.
A tournament (V,E) is in the class GTEQ if it satisfies the following properties. There
is an odd integer m with m ≡ 1 (mod 4) such that,
V = C ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Um,
where C,U1, . . . , Um are defined the same as in G
BA. We have Ci denote the single-
ton {ci}. Moreover, let X =
⋃
{Ui : i ≡ 1 (mod 4)}, Y =
⋃
{Ui : i is even}, and
Z =
⋃
{Ui : i ≡ 3 (mod 4)}.
Intuitively, (V,E) is TTEQϕ for some ϕ in ordered 3-CNF with
1
4(m + 3) clauses. Ev-
ery Ui ∈ X corresponds to a clause of ϕ and the vertices it contains represent (tokens
of) literals. Again, we assume each of these vertices uji to be labeled by the literal λ(u
j
i )
it represents. For i ∈ {1, 5, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we define,
U ji = {u
j
i},
Upi = {u ∈ Ui : λ(u) = p}, and
U¬pi = {u ∈ Ui : λ(u) = ¬p}.
Moreover, for the other values of i, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we stipulate,
U ji = U
p
i = U
¬p
i = ∅.
Observe that
⋃
p∈P
1≤i≤m
(Upi ∪ U
¬p
i ) = X.
25
u19 u
2
9 u
3
9
u17 u
2
7 u
3
7
u15 u
2
5 u
3
5
u13 u
2
3 u
3
3
u11 u
1
2 u
1
3
u8
u6
u4
u2
c0
c1
c3
c5
c7
c9
c2
c4
c6
c8
Figure 6: A tournament TTEQϕ = (V,E) in the class GTEQ . Omitted arcs point down-
wards.
We are now in a position to define the arc set E.
E =
⋃
i<j
(Cj × Ci) ∪
⋃
i 6=j
(Ci × Uj) ∪
⋃
i=j
(Uj × Ci) ∪
⋃
1≤i≤m
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
3
i × U
1
i )
)
∪
⋃
i<j
(
(Ui × Uj) \ (Eϕ ∪ Ez)
)
∪ Eϕ ∪Ez,
where
Eϕ =
⋃
p∈P
i>j
(Upi × U
¬p
j ) ∪
⋃
p∈P
i>j
(U¬pi × U
p
j ) and E
z =
⋃
l 6=l′
i=j+2
(U li × U
l′
j ).
An example of such a tournament is depicted in Figure 6. The notable structural dif-
ferences to GBA are the cycles in Ui for odd i and the arcs E
z between Z and X. Next,
we show that every tournament TTEQϕ is induced by a 7-voter profile, using the same
approach as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Computing TEQ is NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 7.
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Proof. Similar to the proof for Theorem 2, it suffices to show that every tournament
(V,E) in GTEQ is induced by a 7-voter profile. To achieve this, we partition E into four
disjoint arc sets E1, E2, E3, E4 ⊆ E and show that the digraphs (V,E1), (V,E2), and
(V,E3) are each induced by 2-voter profiles as well as that (V,E4) is acyclic. Then the
result follows from Lemma 8.
While the tournaments in GTEQ are very similar to the ones in GBA, the introduction
of new vertices and arcs makes finding an appealing partition a bit trickier. We define
E1 =
⋃
i>j
(
Ci × (Cj ∪ Uj)
)
∪
⋃
i
(U3i × U
1
i ) ∪
⋃
i≡3
mod 4
(
(U1i ∪ U
3
i )× U
2
i−2
)
,
E2 = E
ϕ,
E3 = E
z \ E1, and
E4 = E \ (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3).
It can readily be appreciated that E1, E2, and E3 are contained in E (see Figure 7).
Also, they are pairwise disjoint and therefore {E1, E2, E3, E4} is proper partition of E.
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Figure 7: Illustration of the arc sets E1, E2, E3 ⊂ E in T
TEQ
ϕ = (V,E). The thick arrow
on the left represents all arcs
⋃
i<j{(cj , ci)} being part of E1.
To show that (V,E1) is 2-inducible, we define
E′1 =
⋃
i≤j
Uj⊂X∪Z
(Ci × Uj) ∪
⋃
i≤j
Uj⊂Y
(Uj × Ci) ∪
⋃
i<j
Ui,Uj⊂X∪Z
((Ui × Uj) \ E1) ∪
⋃
i<j
Ui,Uj⊂Y
(Uj × Ui) ∪
⋃
i odd
(
(U1i ∪ U
3
i )× U
2
i
)
∪ (Y × (X ∪ Z)) .
It is straightforward to check that E′1 is a reorientation of E˜1. Also, it is easy but
tedious, by making the obvious case distinctions, to show for E1 and E
′
1 that the out-
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neighborhood of each vertex is contained in the out-neighborhood of each of its in-
neighbors, implying that E1 and E
′
1 are both transitive.
14 For example, consider a
vertex u1i ∈ X in E
′
1 for which
D = U2i ∪
⋃
j>i
j odd
Uj and D = Y ∪
⋃
j<i
j odd
Uj ∪
⋃
j≤i
Cj
denote the set of all out-neighbors and all in-neighbors of u1i in (V,E
′
1), respectively. It
is straightforward to check that every vertex in D also has an arc in E′1 to every vertex
in D.
Thus, in virtue of Lemma 3, (V,E1) is induced by a 2-voter profile.
The proof for (V,E2) being 2-inducible is analogous to the proof of the same statement
in the Banks construction (see Theorem 2). This is also where the orderedness of ϕ is
exploited.
The digraph (V,E3) is obviously transitive. We also observe that it consists of iso-
morphic and vertex-disjoint subgraphs (Ui ∪ Ui−2, E3,i) for i ≡ 3 (mod 4) with Ei =
(U li × U
l′
i−2) for l 6= l
′. It is sufficient to find a general transitive reorientation E′3,i
on such a subgraph because then every completion of
⋃
i≡3(mod 4)E
′
3,i is a transitive
reorientation of E˜3. We define
E′3,i = (Ui × U
2
i−2) ∪
(
(U1i−2 ∪ U
3
i−2)× U
2
i−2
)
∪
(
(U3i−2 ∪ U
1
i )× (U
1
i−2 ∪ U
3
i )
)
∪
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
3
i ).
This subgraph set is also shown in Figure 8 and it is easy to verify that it is indeed
transitive.
u13 u
2
3 u
3
3
u11 u
2
1 u
3
1
Figure 8: The arc set E′3,3 which is part of the reorientation E
′
3 of E˜3 in the proof of
Theorem 3. Dotted arcs denote the incomparability subgraph of E′3,3.
Finally, to see the acyclicity of (V,E4), observe that
E4 =
⋃
i<j
(Ci × Uj) ∪
⋃
i<j
(
(Ui × Uj) \ (Eϕ ∪ Ez)
)
∪
⋃
i
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
3
i )
)
and that E4 is thereby contained in the transitive closure of the ordering
(c0, u
1
1, u
2
1, u
3
1, c1, u2, c2, u
1
3, u
2
3, u
3
3, c3, u4, c4, u
1
5, . . . , cm).
This finishes the proof.
14In a digraph (V,E), the out-neighbors of a vertex x are given by Dx = {y ∈ V : (x, y) ∈ E}. Analo-
gously, the in-neighbors of x are defined as Dx = {y ∈ V : (y, x) ∈ E}.
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7.3 Slater’s Rule and Kemeny’s Rule
Slater’s rule seeks linear rankings over alternatives that minimally conflict with the
pairwise majority relation and returns the maximal elements of these rankings (see, e.g.,
Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a). Formally, given a tournament (V,E), the Slater
score of a linear ranking ≻ of V is the number of pairs (x, y) ∈ V × V such that both
x ≻ y and (x, y) ∈ E. A Slater ranking is a ranking ≻ with maximum Slater score.
The Slater set consists of all those alternatives v ∈ V that occur at the top of a Slater
ranking. There is a close relationship between Slater rankings and feedback arc sets:
maximizing the number of agreed-upon pairwise comparison is the same as minimizing
the number of arcs of (V,E) that need to be turned around so as to produce a transitive
(and so acyclic) tournament. This connection makes it easy to show that computing
Slater rankings is NP-hard in general digraphs, since it is well-known that the feedback
arc set problem is NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979). To show NP-hardness of the
feedback arc set problem restricted to tournaments was a long-standing open problem,
which was then solved independently by Alon (2006), Conitzer (2006), and Charbit et al.
(2007). As a consequence, we now know that computing Slater rankings and the Slater
set is NP-hard for tournaments (see also Hudry, 2010).
A close relative to Slater’s rule is Kemeny’s rule. While Slater’s rule only uses the
information contained in the pairwise majority relation, Kemeny’s rule also takes into
account the magnitude of majority comparison, so that the input to Kemeny’s rule
is a weighted majority tournament. A further difference is that, while Slater’s rule
is typically used so as to produce a set of winners, Kemeny’s rule is typically used
to find consensus rankings. Kemeny’s rule has very appealing axiomatic properties
(Young and Levenglick, 1978). Let us now formally define Kemeny’s rule. Given a
weighted digraph (V,w), the Kemeny score of a linear ranking ≻ of V is
∑
x≻y w(x, y),
and a Kemeny ranking is a ranking with maximum Kemeny score. The Kemeny rule
just returns all Kemeny rankings. Again, notice the close connection to the (weighted)
feedback arc set problem. Further, notice that Kemeny’s and Slater’s rules coincide on
tournaments where every arc has weight 1.
Let us now analyze the complexity of these two rules in a setting where there is a
constant number of voters. For Kemeny’s rule, Dwork et al. (2001) showed the problem
to be hard even for weighted digraphs induced by a profile of 4 voters. Their reduction
contained a small error that was fixed by Biedl et al. (2009). With the tools we developed
in Section 3, we can give a short exposition of this reduction.
Theorem 4. Computing Kemeny’s rule is NP-hard if the number of voters is even and
at least 4.
Proof. As we noted above, computing Kemeny’s rule is equivalent to solving the feedback
arc set problem, so we just need to show that this problem remains hard for digraphs
inducible by 4-voter profiles. (The case for even n > 4 can be seen by just adding two
completely reversed orders to this profile.)
We show this by reduction from feedback arc set on general digraphs. Let (V,E)
be an instance of this problem. Now produce a new digraph (V ′, E′) from (V,E) by
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subdividing every arc. Thus, for each arc (a, b) ∈ E, introduce a new vertex eab ∈ V
′ and
arcs (a, eab) ∈ E
′ and (eab, b) ∈ E
′. Formally, V ′ = V ∪ S, where S = {eab : (a, b) ∈ E}
is the set of subdividers, and E′ = {(a, eab) : (a, b) ∈ E} ∪ {(eab, b) : (a, b) ∈ E}.
a b in (V,E) becomes a eab b in (V
′, E′).
This already completes our description of the reduction. We now claim that (V ′, E′) is
4-inducible, and that the size of the minimum feedback arc set of (V ′, E′) is the same as
that of the original graph (V,E).
To see that (V ′, E′) is 4-inducible, we partition its arcs into two arc-disjoint forests
of unidirected stars. Therefore, by Lemmas 4, 5, and 7, we deduce that (V ′, E′) is
4-inducible. The promised partition is E′ = E1 ∪E2, where
E1 = E
′ ∩ (V × S),
E2 = E
′ ∩ (S × V ).
The set E1 contains arcs from original vertices to subdividers, while the set E2 contains
arcs from subdividers to original vertices (see Figure 9).
eab
eac
ead
eaeeaf
a
(a) The arcs E1.
eab
ecb
edb
eebefb
b
(b) The arcs E2.
Figure 9: Decomposition of a subdivided digraph into two forests of stars.
It is also easy to see that subdivision preserves the size of the minimal feedback arc
set. If F ⊆ E is a feedback arc set of (V,E), then the set F ′ = {(a, eab) : (a, b) ∈ F} is
a feedback arc set of (V ′, E′) of the same size (that is, we delete ‘half’ of every arc of
F ). Conversely, a minimal feedback arc set F ′ of (V ′, E′) will only ever delete one half
of an original arc; deleting an arc of (V,E) whenever half of it is deleted in F ′ gives us
a feedback arc set of (V,E) of the same size as F ′.
It is easy to see that Kemeny’s rule can be computed in polynomial time for only
2 voters (e.g., both of the input votes are also optimal Kemeny rankings). Thus, the
complexity of Kemeny’s rule is settled for every constant even number of voters. The
complexity for a constant odd number of voters was open. We now establish that both
Kemeny’s and Slater’s rules are hard for 7 voters or more.
To do this, we will analyze the reduction by Conitzer (2006) showing hardness of the
feedback arc set problem restricted to tournaments. Conitzer gives a reduction from
MaxSat, which asks for an assignment to the propositional variables in a Boolean
30
formula ϕ such that at least a given number s1 of clauses is satisfied. Due to Lemma 11,
we can constrain ϕ to be in ReducedFew-CNF without affecting the correctness of
Conitzer’s reduction. The reduction is based on tournaments T SLϕ that admit a Slater
ranking with at most s2 inconsistent arcs if and only if an assignment for ϕ with at least
s1 satisfied clauses exists, where s2 depends (polynomially) on ϕ and s1.
Let GSL denote the class of all tournaments T SLϕ obtained from a Boolean formula ϕ
in ReducedFew-CNF according to this construction. A tournament (V,E) is in the
class GSL if it satisfies the following properties. There exist integers m, l ≥ 1, such that
V = C ∪
⋃
1≤i≤m
1≤j≤6
T ji ,
where C and all T ji are pairwise disjoint and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
C = {c1, . . . , c|C|},
T ji = {t
j,1
i , . . . , t
j,l
i }.
Each subtournament (T ji , E ∩ (T
j
i × T
j
i )) has to be a transitive component, i.e., it is a
linear order and for a vertex v ∈ V \ T ji and vertices v1, v2 ∈ T
j
i , either {(v1, v), (v2, v)}
or {(v, v1), (v, v2)} have to be in E. For our purposes, we can treat T
j
i as a single vertex
denoted by tji . Every ci is associated with a clause in ϕ. Abusing notation, we denote
this clause with ci as well. Every Ti corresponds to a variable λ(Ti) in ϕ. For notational
convenience, let
T j =
⋃
1≤i≤m
tji and Ti =
⋃
1≤j≤6
tji .
For (V,E) to be in GSL, the arc set has to be of the form
E = EA ∪
⋃
i
{(t1i , t
2
i ), (t
2
i , t
3
i ), (t
3
i , t
1
i )} ∪
(T 6 × C) ∪ (C × T 1) ∪ Eϕ
where
EA =
⋃
i<j
{(ci, cj)} ∪
⋃
i<j
(Ti × Tj) ∪
⋃
i
⋃
J∈{4,5,6}
1≤j<J
{(tji , t
J
i )}, and
Eϕ = {(t2i , cj), (cj , t
3
i ), (cj , t
4
i ), (t
5
i , cj) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj , cj ∈ C} ∪
{(cj , t
2
i ), (t
3
i , cj), (t
4
i , cj), (cj , t
5
i ) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj , cj ∈ C} ∪
{(cj , t
2
i ), (cj , t
3
i ), (t
4
i , cj), (t
5
i , cj) : λ(Ti),¬λ(Ti) /∈ cj , cj ∈ C}.
So for every clause cj and every variable λ(Ti), the cj vertex points to exactly three of
the six vertices in Ti, but which three vertices are pointed to depends on whether and
how the variable appears the clause.15
An illustration of a tournament in GSL is depicted in Figure 10.
15The tournaments T SLϕ that we have defined differ very slightly from those used in the original reduction
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λ(T3)
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/∈ c3
Figure 10: A schematic of a tournament T SLϕ to illustrate the three different cases for the
arcs between T 2∪T 3∪T 4∪T 5 and C. These arcs are shown as dashed and are
the only ones that depend on ϕ. The thick arrows below and above indicate
the fixed order between and within the T ji , and in between the ci—they stand
for the following implicit, undepicted arcs: the arcs (ci, cj) for i < j, the arcs
in Ti × Tj for i < j, and the arcs in {t
1
i , t
2
i , t
3
i } × {t
4
i , t
5
i , t
6
i }.
Theorem 5. The problems of computing the Slater set and of computing a Kemeny
ranking are NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 7.
Proof. Let (V,E) be a tournament in GSL that is constructed from a formula ϕ in
ReducedFew-CNF whose set of clauses C = C2 ∪ C3 is partitioned into clauses in C2
that contain exactly two literals and clauses in C3 that contain exactly three literals.
We give a transitive (1-inducible) arc set E1 and 2-inducible arc sets E2, E3, E4 such
that putting these four profiles together yields a profile with 7 voters that induces (V,E)
as its majority relation, and moreover, so that the majority margins are all equal to 1.
This gives the desired result.
(Conitzer, 2006). In the case that ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj , the original reduction uses arcs (cj , t
4
i ), (t
5
i , cj), while
we direct them as (t4i , cj), (cj , t
5
i ). Conitzer’s correctness proof goes through with minor changes
to the sentence beginning with “Because dv and ev always have arcs into ck. . . ” (Conitzer, 2006,
Theorem 3).
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E1 = EA ∪
⋃
i
{(t1i , t
2
i ), (t
2
i , t
3
i ), (t
1
i , t
3
i )} ∪
(
(T 1 ∪ · · · ∪ T 6)× (C2 ∪ C3)
)
E2 = (C
2 ∪ C3)× (T 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ T 3)
E3 =
⋃
cj∈C2
{(t3i , t
1
i ), (t
2
i , cj) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj} E4 =
⋃
cj∈C3
{(t2i , cj) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj}
∪
⋃
cj∈C2
{(t3i , t
1
i ), (t
3
i , cj) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj} ∪
⋃
cj∈C3
{(t3i , cj) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj}
∪
⋃
cj∈C3
{(cj , t
4
i ) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj} ∪
⋃
cj∈C2
{(cj , t
4
i ) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj}
∪
⋃
cj∈C3
{(cj , t
5
i ) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj} ∪
⋃
cj∈C2
{(cj , t
5
i ) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj}
The set E1 is complete and transitive: it is induced by the 1-voter profile R1 whose
voter has order t11 > t
2
1 > t
3
1 > t
4
1 > t
5
1 > t
6
1 > t
1
2 > · · · > t
1
m > · · · > t
6
m > c1 > · · · > c|C|.
The set E2 is a bilevel graph, and thus 2-inducible (see Footnote 6) by a profile R2 of 2
voters. The sets E3 and E4 are also 2-inducible by profiles R3 and R4, since E2 and E3
both consist of vertex-disjoint unidirected stars (to see disjointness one appeals to the
definition of ReducedFew-CNF: every variable occurs at most once in C3, and every
literal occurs at most once in C2).
Now, notice that the sets E2, E3, E4 are pairwise disjoint, although certain arcs (from
(C2 ∪ C3) × (T 2 ∪ T 3)) in E2 occur once in the opposite direction in E3 or E4. Thus,
we can see that the union of the profiles R2, R3, and R4 induces the following arcs with
weight 2, and all other arcs with weight 0:⋃
i
{t3i , t
1
i } ∪ {(cj , t
1
i ), (cj , t
3
i ), (cj , t
4
i ) : λ(Ti) ∈ cj, cj ∈ C} ∪
{(cj , t
1
i ), (cj , t
2
i ), (cj , t
5
i ) : ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj, cj ∈ C} ∪
{(cj , t
1
i ), (cj , t
2
i ), (cj , t
3
i ) : λ(Ti),¬λ(Ti) /∈ cj, cj ∈ C}.
But this is precisely the set of arcs on which the intended arc set E and the transitive
set E1 disagree! Hence adding R2, R3, and R4 to the 1-voter profile R1 precisely fixes
these disagreements, and induces our target tournament (V,E). Also notice that all
majority margins have weight 1. The profile constructed has 7 voters, as required.
7.4 Ranked Pairs
The fourth and final voting rule we investigate is called ranked pairs (RP) (see, e.g.,
Fischer et al., 2016). In contrast to the other rules we discussed in the previous sections,
it operates on weighted digraphs and, just like Slater’s rule, does not require the digraph
to be complete. Hence, we have separate results for an odd and for an even number of
voters.
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(a) The arcs in E1 give a transitive tournament, inducible by 1 voter.
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(b) The arcs in E2 form a bilevel graph, and are thus 2-inducible.
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in 3-clause
(c) The arcs in E3 form a (2-inducible) forest of unidirected stars, centred at x
2, y3,
and c3.
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y1
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x occurs
negatively
in 2-clause
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x3
x4
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x6
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positively
in 3-clause
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
c3
x occurs
negatively
in 3-clause
(d) The arcs in E4 form a (2-inducible) forest of unidirected stars, centred at x
2, y3,
and c2.
Figure 11: The decomposition of the arcs of GSL used in the proof of Theorem 5.
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There are two versions of RP commonly discussed in the literature. The one we
are concerned with is the neutral one, i.e., the one that does not differentiate among
alternatives. Deciding whether a given alternative is a winner according to this version
of RP is NP-complete (Brill and Fischer, 2012).
Usually, RP is regarded as a procedure. First, one defines priorities for all pairs of
alternatives, and then ranks the alternatives iteratively in the order of their priority.
The priority over pairs (a, b) of alternatives is given by the number of voters who prefer
a to b. To avoid creating cycles, any pair whose addition would yield a cycle is discarded
in the procedure. The neutral version of RP , which was defined by Tideman (1987)
and considered by Brill and Fischer (2012), returns the set of all rankings the above
procedure returns for some tie breaking rule. From this point on, we refer to this
variant by RP .
The NP-hardness proof by Brill and Fischer (2012) is by a reduction from Sat. For
each Boolean formula ϕ in CNF they constructed a weighted digraph GRPϕ such that
a decision vertex d is selected by RP from GRPϕ if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. The
construction, of course, works just as well for a reduction from 3Sat. We may also
assume that in every formula ϕ in 3-CNF no variable occurs more than once in each
clause.
Since the original construction by Brill and Fischer (2012) does not yield a tourna-
ment, investigating it would give only results involving an even number of voters. How-
ever, a minor modification of the argument results in a tournament, which allows to
consider the case of an odd number of voters. We first define the class GRP in which
the weighted digraphs GRPϕ for formulas ϕ in 3-CNF are contained. Then we prove
that every digraph in this class is induced by an 8-voter profile, showing that deciding
whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is already NP-complete for eight
voters. Later, we define the tournament class T RP and show the same result for an odd
number of voters. Finally we combine these two results into a corollary.
A weighted digraph (V,E) (with weight function w) belongs to GRP if and only if it
satisfies the following conditions. There are some integers m, l ≥ 1 such that
V = D ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Um ∪X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xl,
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
D = {d},
Ui = {u
1
i , u
2
i , u
3
i , u
4
i }, and
Xj = {xj}.
If (V,E) is obtained as the digraph GRPϕ for some ϕ in 3-CNF, l is the number of
clauses, m the number of variables occurring in ϕ, the Uis are the variable gadgets,
the Xjs the clause gadgets, and, finally, D the decision vertex. Let U
j
i = {u
j
i}, U
j =⋃m
i=1{u
j
i}, U =
⋃m
i=1 Ui and X =
⋃l
i=1Xi. Moreover, E = E
σ ∪ Eϕ, where Eσ (the
skeleton) and Eϕ (the formula dependent part) are disjoint such that
Eσ = (D × (U1 ∪ U3)) ∪ (X ×D) ∪
m⋃
i=1
{
(u1i , u
2
i ), (u
2
i , u
3
i ), (u
3
i , u
4
i ), (u
4
i , u
1
i )
}
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and Eϕ is such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and all 1 ≤ j ≤ l:
Eϕ ⊂ (U2 ∪ U4)×X,
|Eϕ ∩ (U2 ∪ U4)×Xj)| ≤ 3, and
|Eϕ ∩ (U2i ∪ U
4
i )×Xj)| ≤ 1,
i.e., every vertex in X has at most three incoming arcs (intuitively corresponding to the
literals x contains) and at most one from every Ui (intuitively corresponding to the fact
that no propositional variable occurs more than once in each clause). Finally, we check
that the weight function w is defined such that all arcs in E ∩ ((U2 × U3) ∪ (U4 × U1))
have weight 4 and all arcs in E \ ((U2 × U3) ∪ (U4 × U1)) have weight 2. An example
illustrating this definition of the class GRP is shown in Figure 12.
d
u21
u11
u41
u31
u22
u12
u42
u32
x1 x2 x3
Figure 12: A digraph (V,E) in the class GRP . Double arcs have weight 4 whereas normal
arcs have weight 2.
Since GRPϕ is incomplete, it can only be induced by a profile involving an even number
of voters. In fact, we will prove that only eight voters suffice to induce any digraph
in GRP .
Theorem 6. Deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is NP-
complete if the number of voters is even and at least 8.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from the fact that it is easy to verify whether a given
ranking can be the outcome of the RP procedure, independently of the number of voters.
For hardness, let (V,E) be a digraph (with weight function w) in GRP . Intuitively,
(V,E) = GRPϕ for some formula ϕ in 3-CNF. It suffices to show that (V,E) is induced
by an 8-voter profile. As an auxiliary notion, let for each 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
Eϕ ∩ ((U2 ∪ U4)×Xj) = E
ϕ
j,1 ∪ E
ϕ
j,2 ∪E
ϕ
j,3,
where |Eϕj,i| ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Intuitively, E
ϕ
j,1, E
ϕ
j,2, and E
ϕ
j,3 impose an ordering on
the incoming arcs of vertex xj . Also set
Eϕi =
l⋃
j=1
Eϕj,i
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E1 E2
E3 E4
Figure 13: The sets E1, E2, E3, and E4 for the digraph of Figure 12 as defined in the
proof of Theorem 6.
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, i.e., Eϕi collects the i-th incoming arcs of the vertices in X. Now
define the following arc sets.
E1 = E
ϕ
1 ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U2i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
4
i × U
1
i )
)
,
E2 = E
ϕ
2 ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U2i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
4
i × U
1
i )
)
,
E3 = E
ϕ
3 ∪ (D × (U
1 ∪ U3)), and
E4 = (X ×D) ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
3
i × U
4
i )
)
.
Observe that E = E1 ∪E2 ∪E3 ∪E4 (see Figure 13). Moreover, each of (V,E1), (V,E2),
(V,E3), and (V,E4) is a vertex-disjoint union of unidirected stars. Hence, by Lemma 5
we may assume they are induced by the 2-voter profiles (R11, R
1
2), (R
2
1, R
2
2), (R
3
1, R
3
2), and
(R41, R
4
2), respectively. Moreover, E1, E2, E3, and E4 all contained in E and therefore
also pairwise orientation compatible. By Lemma 7 it thus follows that (V,E) is induced
by the 8-voter profile
R = (R11, R
1
2, R
2
1, R
2
2, R
3
1, R
3
2, R
4
1, R
4
2).
Moreover, E1, E3, and E4 as well as E2, E3, and E4 are pairwise disjoint whereas
E1∩E2 =
⋃m
i=1
(
(U2i ×U
3
i )∪(U
4
i ×U
1
i )
)
. Thus, all arcs in E\
⋃m
i=1
(
(U2i ×U
3
i )∪(U
4
i ×U
1
i )
)
have weight 2, whereas those in
⋃m
i=1
(
(U2i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
4
i × U
1
i )
)
have weight 4. We
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may conclude that also the digraph (V,E) with its weights is induced by the 8-voter
profile R.
The original hardness construction contained arcs with weights 2 or 4 and unspecified
arcs, defining a priority over the arcs. It is easy to see that increasing all weights in
such a digraph by 1 to 3 and 5 does not change this priority. Similarly, adding arcs
with weight 1 is not harmful as the corresponding pairs are added to the bottom of
the priority, making them irrelevent to determining whether d is an RP winner or not.
Therefore, by incorporating these observations into GRPϕ , for each Boolean formula ϕ
in 3-CNF, we can create a weighted tournament (call it TRPϕ ) from which d is selected
by RP if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. We denote the class of weighted tournaments that
consist of these TRPϕ by T
RP .
We adopt the same notation as for GRP . A weighted tournament (V,E′) (with weight
function w′) belongs to T RP if and only if it satisfies the following conditions. The set
of alternatives can be written as
V = D ∪ U1 ∪ · · · ∪ Um ∪X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xl
whereas the arc set E′ is the union of two disjoint sets E
′σ (the skeleton) and E
′ϕ (the
formula dependent part). Assuming that E is the arc set of GRPϕ , then E
′ϕ = Eϕ and
E
′σ = Eσ ∪ E
′σ
c where
E
′σ
c =
(
((D × U) ∪ (U ×X)) \E
)
∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U1i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
2
i × U
4
i )
)
∪
⋃
i<j
(Ui × Uj) ∪
⋃
i<j
(Xi ×Xj).
E
′σ
c can be equivalently described as a reorientation of E˜. Moreover, we check that w
′
is defined such that all arcs in E
′σ ∩ ((U2 × U3) ∪ (U4 × U1)) have weight 5, all arcs in
(E
′ϕ ∪E
′σ) \ ((U2 ×U3) ∪ (U4 × U1)) have weight 3, and all arcs in E
′σ
c have weight 1.
Now we can give the second result of this section.
Theorem 7. Deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is NP-
complete if the number of voters is odd and at least 11.
Proof. The proof here is similar to that of the previous theorem. Let (V,E′) be a tour-
nament with weight function w′ in T RP . Intuitively, (V,E′) = TRPϕ for some formula ϕ
in 3-CNF. It suffices to show that (V,E′) is induced by an 11-voter profile. Using the
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notation provided in the proof of Theorem 6, we define the following arc sets.
E′1 =E
′ϕ
1 ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U2i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
4
i × U
1
i )
)
,
E′2 =E
′ϕ
2 ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U2i × U
3
i ) ∪ (U
4
i × U
1
i )
)
,
E′3 =E
′ϕ
3 ∪ (D × (U
1 ∪ U3)),
E′4 =(X ×D) ∪
m⋃
i=1
(
(U1i × U
2
i ) ∪ (U
3
i × U
4
i )
)
,
E′5 =(X ×D) ∪
m⋃
i=1
{
(u4i , u
1
i )
}
, and
E′6 =(D × U) ∪ (D ×X) ∪ (U ×X) ∪
⋃
1≤i≤m
j<l
(U ji × U
l
i )∪
⋃
i<j
(Ui × Uj) ∪
⋃
i<j
(Xi ×Xj).
Observe that E′1, E
′
2, E
′
3, E
′
4, and E
′
5 are contained in E
′, making them pairwise orien-
tation compatible, and that each of (V,E′1), (V,E
′
2), (V,E
′
3), (V,E
′
4), and (V,E
′
5) is a
forest of stars. Therefore, in virtue of Lemma 5 we may assume that they are induced
by the 2-voter profiles (R11, R
1
2), (R
2
1, R
2
2), (R
3
1, R
3
2), (R
4
1, R
4
2),and (R
5
1, R
5
2). Moreover, it
can readily be appreciated that E′6 ⊇ E
′ \ (E′1 ∪ . . . ∪ E
′
5). As E
′
6 defines a transitive
closure for an order over all of the alternatives in V (see Figure 14), (V,E′6) is acyclic,
and we may assume that it is induced by a voter with the preference relation R6 = E′6.
Thus by Lemma 8, (V,E′) is induced by the 11-voter profile
R = (R11, R
1
2, R
2
1, R
2
2, R
3
1, R
3
2, R
4
1, R
4
2, R
5
1, R
5
2, R
6).
d
u21
u11
u41
u31
u22
u12
u42
u32
x1 x2 x3
Figure 14: The order implied by the arc set E′6 over the alternatives of a tournament
(V,E′) in the class T RP .
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Voting rule NP-hard for n ≥
Banks set 5 voters
Tournament equilibrium set 7 voters
Slater’s rule 7 voters
Kemeny’s rule 7 voters
Ranked pairs 8 voters (n 6= 9)
Table 6: Numbers of voters for which winner determination is NP-hard. The Banks set
and the tournament equilibrium set are defined for an odd number of voters
only.
Furthermore, note that there are some arcs in common among the arc sets and that
E′6 is not orientation compatible with E
′. Arcs in E
′σ ∩ (U2 × U3) occur in E′1, E
′
2,
and E′6; arcs in E
′σ ∩ (U4 × U1) occur in E′1, E
′
2, and E
′
5 while E
′
6 includes arcs in the
opposing direction or, equivalently, includes
⋃m
i=1(U
1
i × U
4
i ); each arc in (E
′ϕ ∪ E
′σ) \
((U2 ×U3)∪ (U4 ×U1)) occurs in E′6 and exactly one of the other arc sets; and, finally,
arcs in E
′σ
c occur only in E
′
6. Thus, arcs in E
′σ ∩ ((U2×U3)∪ (U4×U1)) have weight 5,
arcs in (E
′ϕ ∪E
′σ) \ ((U2×U3)∪ (U4×U1)) have weight 3, and arcs in E
′σ
c have weight
1. Therefore, we may conclude that (V,E′) together with its weights is induced by the
11-voter profile R.
Corollary 1. Deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is NP-
complete if the number of voters is either 8 or at least 10.
Proof. This follows from Theorems 6 and 7.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Many hardness results in computational social choice only hold if the number of voters is
roughly of the same order as the number of alternatives. In some applications of voting,
however, the number of voters can be much smaller than the number of alternatives and
it is unclear whether hardness still holds.
We gave complete characterizations of 2-inducible and 3-inducible majority digraphs,
respectively, and provided sufficient conditions for k-inducible majority digraphs. Using
an implementation based on SAT solving, we showed that majority digraphs of real-
world and generated preference profiles are inducible by at most eight voters. We did
not encounter a single tournament that is not 5-inducible.16
We then leveraged the sufficient conditions we obtained earlier to show that winner
determination for the Banks set, the tournament equilibrium set, Slater’s rule, Kemeny’s
rule, and ranked pairs remains hard even when there is only a small constant number of
16The smallest concrete tournament known not to be 5-inducible consists of more than 600 million
vertices while non-constructive arguments entail the existence of such a tournament with at most 41
vertices.
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voters. This was achieved by analyzing existing hardness proofs and checking whether
the class of majority digraphs used in these constructions can be induced by small
constant numbers of voters. Our hardness results are summarized in Table 6.
We believe there is some very interesting potential for future work. First, it would
be desirable to completely characterize the sets of digraphs inducible by four, five, or
more voters. Second, the complexity of checking whether a given majority digraph is
k-inducible is wide open for any fixed k ≥ 3. Finally, our techniques can be used to verify
whether other existing hardness proofs in computational social choice remain intact for a
bounded number of voters, most notably hardness shields against manipulation, bribery,
and control.17
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